Creditworthiness and Matching Principles

You are creditworthy for φ-ing only if φ-ing is the right thing to do. Famously though, further conditions are needed too – Kant’s shopkeeper did the right thing, but is not creditworthy for doing so. This case shows that creditworthiness requires that there be a certain kind of explanation of why you did the right thing. The reasons for which you act – your motivating reasons – must meet some further conditions. In this paper, I defend a new account of these conditions. On this account, creditworthiness requires that your motivating reasons be normative reasons, and that the principles from which you act match normative principles

A puzzle about enkratic reasoning

Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then argue that the best solution is to deny that correctness is always independent of your epistemic position. As I explain, a notable upshot is that a central epistemic norm directs us to believe, not simply what is true, but what we are in a position to know

Broome on reasoning

Among the many important contributions of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is an account of what reasoning is and what makes reasoning correct. In this paper we raise some problems for both of these accounts and recommend an alternative approach

Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance

Perspectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by your perspective, that is, your epistemic position. Objectivists hold that what you ought to do is determined by the facts irrespective of your perspective. This paper explores an influential argument for perspectivism which appeals to the thought that the normative is action guiding. The crucial premise of the argument is that you ought to φ only if you are able to φ for the reasons which determine that you ought to φ. We show that this premise can be understood in different ways. On one reading, it provides no support for perspectivism. On another reading, the premise lacks support. So, the argument fails. An important upshot of the paper is that the objectivist can embrace the thought about guidance

Two accounts of the normativity of rationality

Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference to the subjective reasons account of rationality. The second half suggest that this point may have been missed because of certain similarities between the subjective reasons account and the importantly different transparency account. On the transparency account, rationality seems not to be normative. I think it is often assumed that what goes for the transparency account goes for the subjective reasons account as well. But I argue that this is a mistake. A corollary is that the subjective reasons account has an important advantage over the transparency account, given how plausible it is that rationality is normative

The Symmetry of Rational Requirements

Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries between the different ways of avoiding irrationality. In this paper I defend the Wide-Scope view against recent objections of this sort from Mark Schroeder and Niko Kolodny. I argue that once we are clear about what the Wide-Scope view is committed to—and, importantly, what it is not—we can see that Schroeder and Kolodny’s objections fail

Instrumental Rationality

This is a short introductory article. I focus on three questions: What is instrumental rationality? What are the principles of instrumental rationality? Could instrumental rationality be all of practical rationality

Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality

First paragraph: Rationality seems to be normative. If you fail to do something rationality requires of you, you have failed in a serious way. The charge of irrationality is, in and of itself, a serious criticism. By contrast, other systems of requirements seem not to be normative. For example, if you fail to do something that etiquette requires of you, or that freemasonry requires of you, you may not have failed in a serious way. These requirements do not have the genuine normative force that rational requirements seem to have

Movements of Transient Coyotes, Canis latrans, in Urbanized Eastern Massachusetts

I document the movements of five transient (or nomadic) eastern Coyotes (Canis latrans) in heavily urbanized eastern Massachusetts. Linear movements from capture location to end location varied from 23.0 to 100.5 km and averaged 63.8 ± 52.0 km for two females and 38.7 ± 17.2 km for three males (t = 0.657, df = 1.15, P = 0.618). Transients ranged in age between 1-2 yr old. There was no relationship between Coyote body weight and dispersal distances (r = 0.389, P = 0.518). Coyotes travel long distances even in human-dominated areas, allowing transients to find vacant territories. Because of the ability of Coyotes to colonize and recolonize areas, I recommend that Coyote management efforts focus more on educating the public about actual Coyote behavior and their life history needs than on killing them

Observations of Coywolves, Canis latrans × lycaon, Crossing Bridges and Using Human Structures on Cape Cod, Massachusetts

I directly observed Coywolves (Canis latrans × lycaon; also called Eastern Coyote) successfully crossing over rivers/bays by traveling on paved (i.e., used by vehicles) bridges within their established territories. These data confirm that Coyotes/Coywolves use these narrow corridors in their travels, such as when colonizing new areas. I also report on breeding female, sick, and old Coywolves using human structures, including under overturned boats/canoes, under houses, and under sheds/decks. Breeding females (n = 3) used these sites as dens, and sick (n = 2) and old (n = 2) individuals used them for shelter